

The Limits of EU Market Power in Migration Externalization: Explaining Migration Control Provisions in EU Preferential Trade Agreements

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) increasingly seeks cooperation with transit and sending countries to prevent irregular migration and enforce returns. Yet, these countries have little incentives to engage in such cooperation. To overcome interest asymmetries, the EU has sought to link trade and migration control in its preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Drawing on a comprehensive dataset of migration provisions in all PTAs signed between 1960 and 2020 and a qualitative analysis of key policy documents, we show that the inclusion of such provisions does not follow patterns of interdependence and strategic priorities resulting from problem pressure. Rather, the proliferation of migration control provisions in EU PTAs is best explained by the institutional framework guiding the negotiation of these provisions. Whilst reflecting the political will to use PTAs as a ‘carrot’ to incite third-country cooperation, these findings also show the limits of targeted action on migration control via commercial policies.

Keywords: European Union; externalization; free trade agreements; migration policy; non-trade policy objectives

Introduction

Since its inception in the 1990s, one of the central aims of the European Union’s (EU) migration policy has been the prevention of irregular migration into the EU and the return of migrants without a legal residence status (Boswell, 2003; Geddes, 2000; Stutz, 2023). However, both aims require the cooperation of sending and transit countries. For them, cooperation on migration control typically involves high costs and little benefits: preventing migration not only needs resources but also, if effective, reduces the benefits from emigration such as remittances. When it comes to cooperation on readmission, sending states face challenges related to the reintegration of returned migrants (Ellermann, 2008; Hampshire, 2016, p. 574). As a consequence, EU efforts at enlisting the cooperation of countries of transit and origin of migrants have had only limited success (Stutz and Trauner, 2022, p. 155). Attempts to strengthen the external dimension as a ‘gold but old element of an effective migration policy’ (Longo and Fontana, 2022, p. 489) have recurrently failed in their objective.

The EU’s weakness in external migration policy contrasts with its clout as an international ‘market power’ (Damro, 2015). It is well established that the EU has been using trade and cooperation agreements to project rules, values and interests onto third countries in a wide array of policy areas – including migration (Jurje and Lavenex, 2014; Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006). Since the mid-1990s, the EU has already inserted migration clauses

into trade agreements ‘to exploit the accumulated bargaining power of the Fifteen to facilitate the conclusion of readmission agreements with non-Member States’ (Noll, 2000, p. 206). The linkage between EU trade power and migration cooperation with third countries has gained prominence since the 2002 Seville Council, where the signature of future association or cooperation agreements was made dependent on the inclusion of a compulsory readmission clause (Lavenex, 2002). More recently, the Commission has proposed to link unilateral trade concessions to developing countries to cooperation on migrant readmission (Council of the EU, 2022) and has managed to include extensive provisions on readmission in the post-Cotonou agreement with the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) signed in spring 2021 (Carbone, 2022; Cassarino, 2022).

Somewhat surprisingly, then, we thus far lack systematic knowledge of how the EU links preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to migration control. Whilst a vibrant literature has documented a growing inclusion of non-trade issues in EU PTAs, such as the protection of the environment, human rights and security objectives (Ariel and Haftel, 2021; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Lechner, 2019; Milewicz et al., 2018; Morin and Jinnah, 2018), the issue of migration control has only rarely attracted scholarly attention (Jurje and Lavenex, 2014). Similarly, whilst the mapping of EU migration policy instruments has shown that clauses in PTAs are the most frequently used tool in this area (Longo and Fontana, 2022, p. 501), the literature on the EU’s external migration law and governance has rarely studied trade agreements as a venue for cooperation on migration control (but see Lavenex, 2002; Peers, 2004). Compared with other PTAs worldwide, those concluded by the EU stand out for including a high number of migration-related provisions and, especially, such pertaining to migration control (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik et al., 2023). However, so far, we know little about when and how migration control features in EU PTAs and what may explain this linkage.

This article makes two main contributions to fill this gap. First, we provide the first comprehensive mapping of EU PTA content related to the issue of migration control, based on a global dataset on the migration content of trade agreements concluded between 1960 and 2020 (Lavenex et al., 2023). Second, we test whether strategic or institutionalist factors can account for the inclusion of migration control in EU PTAs, bringing together the literature on PTA design and external migration policy. We distinguish between strategic explanations focused on EU trade leverage and problem pressure on the one hand and explanations focused on the institutional framework within which trade negotiators operate on the other, such as the type of trade agreement, the existence of formalized political relations and migration policy competence. Combining statistical analysis with qualitative content analysis of individual PTAs and key policy documents, we find that despite the EU’s strong trade power and keen interest in externalizing migration control, strategic explanations based on trade leverage and problem pressure fall short in accounting for the inclusion of migration control provisions in EU PTAs, which is best explained by a combination of institutionalist factors. We find that a systematic inclusion of migration control provisions emerges after the introduction of EU competence and the political impetus from the Seville Council but is limited to broader EU PTAs such as association, cooperation or development agreements. Overall, we find that the trade–migration control linkage is strongly institutionalized but, contrary to strategic ambitions, is not used as a targeted tool of EU external migration policy.

I. Theorizing the Trade–Migration Control Linkage

Migration control is not a trade issue. Whilst the facilitation of short-term migration for service trade and investment has become a common feature of PTAs (Lavenex et al., 2023), migration control has no substantive connection with the liberalization or regulation of trade. This also distinguishes migration control provisions from other non-trade issues in PTAs that seek to ensure fair competition or social and environmental standards for traded goods. Migration control involves cooperation on the prevention of irregular migration and the enforcement of migration rules through readmission. Thus, specific trade interests are unlikely to drive the trade–migration control linkage, even though they might limit the EU's capacity to insist on it (Peers, 2004). What does then explain when the EU includes such provisions in trade agreements? In the following, we develop two main hypotheses: one based on strategic considerations of problem pressure from irregular migration and political–economic leverage vis-à-vis PTA partner countries and one based on the role of the broader institutional framework, namely, the type of trade agreement, the type of cooperation relations with a given third country and EU competence for external migration policies.

First, variation in the migration control content of EU PTAs could emanate from strategic calculations reflecting a targeted choice of PTAs based on the patterns of interdependence with the respective partner countries. The content of PTAs is often the outcome of complicated negotiations taking place over several years. On the issue of migration control, these negotiations face a fundamental conflict of interest between sending and receiving countries of migration that typically leaves few opportunities for mutual gains from cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Research on the external dimension of EU migration policies has demonstrated its security-driven approach, focused on border control and return (Lavenex, 2006; Longo and Fontana, 2022), whereas sending and transit countries of migration have an interest in avoiding the costs of reintegration and in reaping the benefits of remittances, including of migrants staying irregularly (Ellermann, 2008). Whilst this interest asymmetry impedes the conclusion of readmission agreements, PTAs provide a venue to circumvent this conflict through issue linkage and the conclusion of package deals, a classic solution to one-way problems (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Assuming rationality on both sides, however, a third country would agree to such a linkage only if the (trade) benefits outweigh the (migration control) costs. As a result, in a strategic perspective, we expect EU negotiators to pursue the trade–migration control linkage in a selective and targeted fashion with third countries where the EU has considerable trade leverage to deploy and where the problem pressure is high enough to make the high costs of including clauses that are not in the third countries' interest worthwhile. We expect this to be the case if the third country is strongly dependent on trade with the EU and therefore willing to pay a significant price for the conclusion of a PTA that secures and expands trade integration with the EU.

Hypothesis 1a: The more dependent a PTA partner country is on trade with the EU, the more likely is the inclusion of migration control clauses in a PTA with that country.

On the other hand, the literature on migration diplomacy reminds us that sending and transit countries have considerable leverage vis-à-vis destination countries and are able to

demand a high price for cooperation on readmission and border control (Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019; see also Laube, 2019). Thus, we expect that whether PTAs provide the necessary leverage depends not only on the trade power at the EU's disposal but also on its willingness to deploy this bargaining capital, potentially at the expense of both trade interests and other policy objectives such as development (Hampshire, 2016; Peers, 2004). In an interest-driven perspective, the willingness should be a function of how beneficial migration control cooperation is for the EU. We therefore expect that the EU is more likely to push for the inclusion of migration control provisions when the problem pressure is higher, that is, with countries of origin of a significant number of asylum seekers or transit countries that lie along important routes for irregular migration towards the EU.

Hypothesis 1b: The higher the migration pressure from a partner country, the more likely is the inclusion of migration control clauses in a PTA with that country.

The second set of hypotheses focuses on the institutional context in which the EU negotiates these agreements. From this perspective, we expect migration control provisions in PTAs to be a function of the institutional framework that defines the policy space in which the EU negotiators operate. This framework consists of the established rules for cooperation with a third country on the one hand and of the rules governing EU trade and external migration policy on the other. Research on EU external relations has highlighted that the EU's approach is often guided by internal logics and institutionalized routines rather than third-country-specific interests (Börzel et al., 2008; Jurje and Lavenex, 2014). This is often explained with the EU's internal complexity as a foreign policy actor and the recourse to routines and institutional rules to enable action (Bicchi, 2006). In our case, the uncertainty characterizing migration flows and the temporal mismatch between fluctuating migration pressure and diplomatic negotiation schedules add to the limits of strategic action. Finally, in a negotiation setting, strategic choices are also constrained by the position of the negotiation partner, which makes resorting to institutionalized routines more likely.

There are three ways in which the institutional framework governing EU trade negotiations can shape the migration content of PTAs. First, the type of PTA conditions how broad and far-reaching the inclusion of non-trade issues can be. EU PTAs come in many shapes and forms and range from pure free trade agreements to development cooperation agreements and more encompassing association agreements (Gstöhl and De Bièvre, 2018, p. 55). The type of agreement is an important expression of the depth of economic and political relations with third countries. Agreements with a broader scope provide more political leverage and thereby should facilitate issue linkage between trade and migration control. Borchert et al. (2021, p. 627) have found that whilst all types of PTAs include non-trade policy objectives to an increasing degree, association agreements tend to incorporate more political non-trade objectives (defined as civil and political rights and security issues). Accordingly, we expect that agreements with a broader objective of political integration are more likely to serve as a venue for migration control governance than pure free trade agreements.

Hypothesis 2a: Pure trade agreements are less likely to include migration control provisions than PTAs with a broader political objective.

Next to the type of PTA, EU–third country relationships are also structured by concentric circles of foreign policy initiatives (Lavenex, 2011). This is strongly tied to the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policies, which increase EU influence in its 'backyard' (Ariel and Haftel, 2021; Stutz, 2023), through a perspective of eventual accession or structured cooperation. Research on the 'tools' used in EU external migration governance has found distinct regional patterns in line with this reasoning: whilst formal and legal tools (such as PTA clauses or formal readmission agreements) dominate migration cooperation with the Western Balkan countries, a mix of informal and formal tools is found to be used in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood countries, whilst cooperation beyond neighbours is dominated by informal cooperation tools such as dialogues and 'arrangements' (Longo and Fontana, 2022, pp. 503–504). Overall, candidate countries and countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and with established cooperation have been found to have the broadest cooperation on migration with the EU (Stutz, 2023). We expect this variation to also be reflected in the migration control content of EU PTAs, so that migration clauses should be more likely to be included when the PTA partner country is part of the EU's neighbourhood policy or accession process:

Hypothesis 2b: PTAs with candidate countries and countries of the ENP are more likely to include migration control clauses than PTAs with other third countries.

Third, we expect the migration content of EU PTAs to be connected to the EU's policy competence in migration and trade policy. Whilst competence to conclude trade agreements lies exclusively with the EU, competence on migration has evolved over time and is shared between the EU and the member states. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU was given competence to adopt common rules on migration and to conclude agreements with third countries in this regard (Coleman, 2009, p. 73). On a political level, the 'external dimension' of EU migration policies was established at the Tampere European Council in the same year (Lavenex, 2006, p. 333). Three years later, the linkage between trade and migration control was endorsed at the highest political level, when the European Council decided at its Seville summit that each future EU association or cooperation agreement should include a clause on 'joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration' (European Council, 2002), implying that the EU would no longer sign any association or cooperation agreement unless the other side agreed to the standard obligations regarding readmission and migration management. If the migration clauses in PTAs reflect this development, the introduction of competence in 1999 should render an inclusion of migration control more likely. From a (historical) institutionalist perspective, this effect should also become stronger over time as once established, patterns of cooperation become 'sticky' and lead to a path dependence where the inclusion in future PTAs also becomes more likely (Pierson, 2000). Previous research shows that newer PTAs are indeed more likely to include migration provisions (Jurje and Lavenex, 2014, p. 330). From this perspective, we thus expect:

Hypothesis 2c: EU PTAs are more likely to include migration control clauses after the introduction of EU foreign policy competence in migration control.

II. Data and Method

To map and explain the trade–migration control linkage in EU trade agreements, we use the novel ‘Migration Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements’ (MITA) dataset (Lavenex et al., 2023). MITA offers global coverage of migration-related content in PTAs signed between 1960 and 2020 and codes 10 types of provisions related to migration control. The dataset contains the EU’s 109 bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements concluded in this timeframe (see Table A1 for the complete list). Migration control provisions are defined as provisions ‘related to immigration enforcement and the prevention of unauthorized immigration’. With 41 out of the 109 agreements (37.6%), we find a substantial share of PTAs that include a linkage between trade and migration control. The 10 migration control variables in MITA can be classified along the importance of migration control within a PTA (mentioned as objective, own chapter), commitments to dialogue or regulatory cooperation and commitments for specific actions (e.g., readmission of a country’s own nationals). All provisions are coded as binary variables (presence/absence). Table 1 lists all variables on migration control provisions and their absolute and relative frequencies in EU PTAs.

Whilst nearly 40% of EU PTAs contain relevant clauses, migration control is only listed as a specific objective of PTAs in 13 % (see Table A1). A dedicated chapter on migration control figures in 8% of all PTAs. The most frequent substantive clauses on migration control are the commitment to prevent ‘illegal’ migration and to establish readmission and regulatory cooperation. These provisions also very frequently appear together in the same PTA (see Figure A1). Commitments for the reintegration of returned migrants and the compliance with existing agreements on migration control are overall less frequent and only appear in 6% and 7% of all PTAs, respectively. Regarding the modalities of cooperation, clauses related to dialogue or linking migration control to development

Table 1: Migration Control Clauses in EU PTAs.

Type of clause	Variable	Description	Number of EU PTAs	Share of all EU PTAs (in %)
Status within a PTA	conobj	Migration control as objective of the PTA	14	13
	conchp	Chapter on migration control	9	8
	condsm	Dispute settlement applied to migration control	8	7
Modalities of cooperation	conreg	Regulatory cooperation on migration control	30	28
	condev	Link migration control and development	13	12
	condia	Dialogue on migration control	16	15
Substantive policy commitment	conrea	Readmission commitment	30	29
	conrtn	Commitment on the reintegration of returned immigrants	7	6
	conirr	Commitment to prevent irregular migration	36	33
	concom	Compliance with bilateral or multilateral agreement on migration control	8	7

Note: See Table A2 for a more detailed variable description.

Source: MITA dataset. Abbreviation: PTAs, preferential trade agreements.

are less frequent and mostly appear in tandem. Overall, the migration control content in PTAs reflects a focus on commitments on readmission and the prevention of irregular migration and regulatory cooperation between the PTA partners.

Our unit of analysis for studying the drivers of including migration control clauses is single PTAs. Our main dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when a PTA includes at least one migration control provision (otherwise 0). We use a series of independent variables to test our hypotheses. For the first two hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), we capture the level of trade dependence of the partner country as the share of the bilateral trade volume with the EU in percentage of its total GDP. The data sources are the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the complementary dataset by Gleditsch (2002) to maximize coverage. We take the average of the three years preceding the signature of a PTA to account for the fact that PTA negotiations often take several years. The resulting value for trade dependence is log-transformed in the regression analysis to adjust for the skewed distribution (see Figure A3). We use two measures for the level of migration pressure to the EU. First, we use the number of asylum applications from Eurostat as a proxy for the quantity of unsolicited migration flows from a given country. Due to limited data availability, we use the number of asylum applications in the six EU countries receiving the most applications between 1986 and 2020 – Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands. This covers the period for which consistent data are available for these six countries. We measure the average of the 3 years preceding the signature of a PTA. The asylum variable is log-transformed in the regression analysis to adjust for its highly skewed distribution (see Figure A3). As a proxy for transit countries, we use a binary variable capturing whether a partner country is located along one of the main migratory routes towards the EU as identified by Frontex (2022).

For Hypothesis 2a, we create a binary variable classifying PTAs into free trade agreements and customs unions, on the one hand, and broader PTAs with a political dimension, on the other, including association and development-related framework agreements and accession-related agreements (see Table A3). For Hypothesis 2b, we create a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a country is covered by the ENP or the EU accession process. As only a few PTAs were signed with the respective countries after the ENP was officially adopted in 2004 ($N = 4$) and after they officially gained candidate status ($N = 4$), the respective countries are coded as 1 irrespective of the year a PTA was signed with them. Finally, the institutionalization of EU migration policy (Hypothesis 2c) is measured with a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when a PTA was signed after the EU gained foreign policy competence on migration (year 1999).

Our analysis combines quantitative–comparative analysis with qualitative evidence from policy documents and PTAs themselves. First, we conduct descriptive statistical analyses to map migration control provisions and assess the association with potential drivers of the trade–migration control nexus. In addition, we estimate bivariate and multivariate probit models with penalized maximum likelihood estimators (Rainey and McCaskey, 2021), the results of which are reported in Appendix A. Second, we combine the statistical analysis with a qualitative content analysis of individual PTAs and key strategic policy documents on the EU's external migration policy published between 1990 and 2021, including Council and European Council conclusions and Commission communications. Considering the relatively small number of PTAs ($N = 109$) and the


further reduction of the sample size due to limited data coverage in some of the independent variables, this combined approach allows us to meaningfully capture and explain the variation in PTA content. The statistical analysis unveils general patterns and the qualitative analysis corroborates the specific content and motivation of PTA provisions.

III. What Drives the Trade–Migration Control Linkage?

We start by assessing the evidence for the strategic and institutionalist explanations of migration control provisions in PTAs using descriptive statistics. Is the EU more likely to include migration control clauses in PTAs with countries that are more dependent on trade with the EU? Figure 1 suggests that the level of trade dependence increases the likelihood of migration control clauses in PTAs. At the same time, it shows that the PTAs where we do find migration control clauses are nearly all broader political agreements.

Next to trade dependence, we also hypothesized migration pressure to motivate the inclusion of migration control clauses in PTAs. Similar to trade dependence, Figure 1 is in line with the hypothesis as PTAs with migration control clauses are signed with countries that tend to have higher numbers of asylum seekers. However, the figure also shows again that the overwhelming majority of PTAs with migration control clauses are broader agreements. This suggests that the type of PTA is the main factor explaining the inclusion of migration provisions in PTAs. This pattern is confirmed in the bivariate regression analysis (see Tables A4 and A5) where we find a positive but substantively small and statistically non-significant association of migration control clauses with the level of trade dependence and the number of asylum applications. When we include the type of PTA into the regression models, the positive association disappears for asylum applications, whilst it stays similar for the level of trade dependence (see Table A5). Thus, when accounting for institutional factors, there is no evidence that the problem pressure increases

Figure 1: Trade Dependence, Asylum Applications and the Migration Control Content of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) by Type.




the likelihood of migration control provisions in PTAs, and thus, we have to reject the hypotheses according to which migration control clauses are inserted strategically.

Looking at transit countries along the main irregular migration routes to the EU, we find that PTAs with countries along a migratory route are more than three times more likely to include migration control provisions than PTAs with other countries in the bivariate analysis. However, the effect turns negative in multivariate models that include the type of PTA (Table A5; whilst the PTA type and the route variable are only weakly correlated with each other – see Figure A2). This is further evidence against the hypotheses that strategic considerations shape the migration control content of PTAs.

In contrast, Figure 1 and the regression analysis show strong support for the institutional hypothesis that the type of PTA conditions its migration control content (Hypothesis 2a). We find a large positive and statistically significant effect for broader PTAs compared with pure free trade agreements in both the bivariate and multivariate regression models (see Tables A4 and A5). As Figure 2 shows, PTAs signed with ENP countries are also more likely to include migration control provisions, in line with Hypothesis 2b. This is not the case for current and former candidate countries, however. This pattern is confirmed in the regression analysis, with PTAs with ENP countries being more than four times more likely to include migration control provisions, also when we control for the PTA type (which in and of itself is not strongly correlated with either the ENP or candidate status of a PTA partner country; see Figure A2). For candidate countries, the lower likelihood of migration control provisions shown in Figure 2 and in the bivariate regression turns positive in a multivariate regression model that includes the PTA type. This suggests that the negative relationship is driven by earlier PTAs, which were more likely to be pure free trade agreements. Taken together, the results show that the pre-defined scope of a PTA type, together with the geographical location or a close political relationship, explains best whether or not migration control is included.

In addition to the type of PTA, we hypothesized that the migration control content might be linked to the advent of EU competence (Hypothesis 2c) and that the institutionalization of migration policy competence should increase the likelihood for PTAs to

Figure 2: Share of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) With Migration Control Provisions by Type of Partner Country. ENP, European Neighbourhood Policy.




contain migration control clauses. Whilst we do find that PTAs concluded after 1999 are significantly more likely to contain migration control provisions (see Table A4), Figure 3 shows that migration control has entered PTAs much earlier, in the 1980s, and that the share of PTAs with such provisions has risen significantly in the mid-1990s, *before* the introduction of a dedicated EU competence for external migration policies and agreements. The temporal pattern thus suggests that the introduction of a dedicated EU competence was no decisive turning point, contrary to our expectations.

In order to better understand the implications of changes in the EU's migration policy competence on the inclusion of migration control provisions in PTAs, we take a closer look at individual PTAs and complement this with an analysis of key policy documents. As Figure 3 shows, the linkage emerged in the 1980s, when member states' home affairs ministries started to cooperate at a purely transgovernmental level outside the EU framework (Lavenex, 2001, p. 858). The first agreement with a control provision was the Lomé Convention concluded in 1984 with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, followed by another ACP agreement in 1989. The two agreements contain a commitment to prevent irregular migration but do not address readmission.

In policy documents, the trade–migration control nexus starts to emerge in the early 1990s. Even though the EU lacked the legal competence to conclude migration-related agreements with third countries at the time (Peers, 2004, p. 194), readmission, return and the 'fight against illegal migration' were a core theme in the first proposals by the Commission and the Council to harmonize member states' immigration policies

Figure 3: Share of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) With Migration Control Clauses Over Time. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)] [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)]



Source: MITA. Notes: Average share of newly concluded PTAs with at least one migration control clause compared with all EU PTAs signed within each 5-year interval.


(Coleman, 2009, p. 19; Council of the EU, 1991, p. 5). The first explicit link between trade agreements and readmission can be traced back to November 1993, when the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council discussed linking 'Europe agreements, other association or cooperation agreements and third countries' practices as regards the readmission of illegal immigrants' (Council of the EU, 1993, p. 6), thus revealing a clear preference for including readmission clauses in certain types of PTAs. This was followed up in the agreements with Moldova, Russia and Ukraine in 1994, which acknowledge the 'principle and practice' of readmission, without however containing a reference to readmission agreements or specific readmission commitments.¹ In 1995, the JHA Council adopted a standard readmission clause to be included in agreements by the Community on a case-by-case basis, supplemented in 1996 by a standard clause for mixed agreements that cover both issues of EU and those of member state competence (Coleman, 2009, p. 212; Council of the EU, 1995, 1996). The clauses contained a commitment to cooperate 'for the prevention and control of illegal migration', a commitment to readmit nationals and third-country nationals staying illegally in an EU member state or the partner country, respectively, and the commitment by the partner country to conclude bilateral readmission agreements with the member states who request it (Council of the EU, 1995, 1996).

Whilst these standard clauses suggest that migration control should have been included in all types of PTAs, this has not materialized in practice. A closer look at the individual migration provisions in broader agreements in Figure 4 shows that there is significant variation in the clauses on readmission and the fight against illegal migration in the 1990s. This variation seems to be mostly regional. Between 1994 and 1999, PTAs with most Central and Eastern European states and Central Asian countries all refer to the principle of readmission or contain specific readmission commitments, but this is not the case for Southern Neighbourhood countries: the association agreements signed with Tunisia (1995) and Morocco (1996) commit the partners to a regular dialogue on 'illegal immigration and the conditions governing (...) return' and programs to reduce 'migratory pressure' and to resettle 'those repatriated because of their illegal status under the legislation of the state in question', but they fall short of the wording in the standard clauses and of a commitment to readmit own nationals. The PTA with Israel of 1995 only refers to the prevention of illegal migration, whilst the association agreement with the Palestinian Authority signed in 1997 does not include any provisions related to migration control. This regional variation – more specific and stronger commitments with countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood and less stringent provisions in PTAs with Southern Neighbourhood countries – is in line with research on the broader set of external migration policy tools, which finds that legal tools dominate with the former but not the latter (Longo and Fontana, 2022, p. 504).

The varied picture changes after the introduction of EU competence to conclude readmission agreements with third countries in 1999. On the political level, the new competence to conclude readmission agreements did lead to a different approach in the Council, which adapted its 1995 and 1996 clauses, stating that readmission clauses in PTAs should now commit third countries to the conclusion of a dedicated EU readmission agreement (rather than agreements with individual member states). Moreover, the new standard

¹ Art. 26 EC-Moldova, Art. 84 EC-Russia and Art. 20 EC-Ukraine. In 1994, the EU equally concluded free trade agreements with Latvia and Lithuania without a reference to control provisions.

Figure 4: Migration Control Clauses in EU Preferential Trade Agreements.



Source: MITA. Notes: The clauses refer to (1) conchp – dedicated chapter on migration control, (2) concom – compliance with another migration control agreement, (3) condev – development and migration control linkage, (4) condia – dialogue on migration control, (5) condsm – migration control covered by dispute settlement, (6) conill – commitment to prevent illegal migration, (7) conobj – migration control as objective, (8) conrea – readmission commitment, (9) conreg – regulatory cooperation and (10) conrst – returnee integration.

clause applied to all community and mixed agreements as opposed to a case-by-case approach (Council of the EU, 1999, printed in Peers, 2004, p. 219). At the European Council in Seville in 2002, member states decided to both expand the migration control content

of PTAs and limit such clauses to EU association or cooperation agreement (European Council, 2002). This limitation might help explain why we do not see a systematic increase in the share of PTAs with control provisions but rather a drop between 2005 and 2014 (Figure 3) despite the heightened political significance of the trade–migration linkage.

Indeed, after 2002, nearly all broader political agreements contain several control clauses and the specific commitment to readmit own citizens staying irregularly and to conclude dedicated readmission agreements in the future, including for third-country nationals. Such a clause is only missing in PTAs with countries with whom the EU had previously concluded a readmission agreement (Armenia 2017, Georgia 2014, Moldova 2014 and Ukraine 2014). Consequently, those PTAs contain a clause requiring compliance with existing readmission agreements instead of a readmission commitment within the PTA. Thus, it is the Seville Council decision rather than the introduction of EU competence for readmission that seems to have led to a systematic inclusion of migration control clauses in these types of agreements, whereas before, we do find variation also within the same types of PTAs.

Overall, the more detailed analysis suggests that political decisions taken at the level of the Council and the European Council, rather than questions of competence or the type of PTA per se, account for the inclusion of migration control in EU PTAs. Thus, the confirmation of our institutionalist hypotheses does not imply that political strategy does not influence the linkage of trade and migration control. We find that the political emphasis on the linkage and the decision to include migration control in association and cooperation agreements did indeed materialize across the board, in contrast to findings that some third countries are more reluctant than others to commit to readmission from EU member states. However, the fact that the EU is much less successful in concluding formal readmission agreements across all neighbour regions and beyond (Longo and Fontana, 2022) suggests that the systematic linkage of trade and migration control is not so much a successful use of the EU's strongest foreign policy tool as a spending of bargaining capital for symbolic commitments.

Conclusion

In this article, we have traced how and when EU PTAs are used as a venue of migration control governance. In so doing, we have provided the first comprehensive overview of migration control clauses in EU PTAs and developed two types of possible explanations for the presence of such clauses based on strategic considerations on the one hand and institutionalist explanations on the other. Our analysis shows that the EU has included migration control provisions since the mid-1980s, before gaining competence to conclude international agreements on migration. Migration control clauses have become a common feature of EU PTAs but are mostly limited to association-, development- and accession-related agreements and more likely to feature in PTAs with countries in the EU's neighbourhood. In contrast, the level of trade dependence, the number of asylum seekers and the location of a PTA partner country on a main migration route are not good predictors of the migration control content in PTAs if the PTA type is taken into account. Instead, our analysis shows that the leverage of EU market power via commitments in PTAs has hitherto remained limited to broader political agreements and does not follow a

strategic selection logic based on trade or migration interdependence. The qualitative analysis of policy documents disclosed the institutional dynamics behind these developments, showing that the wording of migration control clauses has become stronger and more consistent over time following the adoption of a standard clause for all PTAs in 1999 and the introduction of conditionality at the Seville European Council in 2002, where EU leaders decided to only conclude association or cooperation agreements if they contain a readmission clause. The recently negotiated EU-OACPS (or ‘post-Cotonou’) agreement constitutes the preliminary peak in this development, as it includes highly operational provisions on readmission, more akin to formal readmission agreements than to the standard PTA clause, next to a sanction mechanism for non-cooperation (Carbone, 2022).

In sum, our analysis provides evidence that the EU is not just pretending when it recurrently declares to use ‘all relevant EU policies, instruments and tools’ (European Commission, 2021, p. 1) to make sending countries cooperate on migration enforcement – indeed, we show that it has made systematic use of its strongest foreign policy tool, trade agreements, and with increasing stringency. In doing so, the EU has however followed the priorities set by the overarching institutional framework of its external relations rather than country-specific strategic cost–benefit calculations. Whilst our qualitative analysis has also highlighted some limits to the EU’s capacity to realize its ambitions, more research should delve into negotiation dynamics and study cases in which the EU has failed to negotiate corresponding provisions. Importantly, scholars should also pay attention to the adverse effects this instrumentalization of trade relations has on EU external affairs and its image in the world. This is all the more important when we bear in mind the result of recent research that even the most formalized and detailed readmission agreements have very had limited effects on the EU’s capacity to increase return rates (Stutz and Trauner, 2022).

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Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in Zenodo at <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7699054>.

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Appendix A

Table A1: List of EU Trade Agreements.

No.	Partner country	Year	Name	PTA type
1	Greece	1961	Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece	1
2	Turkey	1963	Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey	1
3	Associated States	1963	Convention of association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community (Yaoundé I)	1
4	Morocco	1969	Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco	0
5	Tunisia	1969	Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia and related documents	0
6	Kenya; Uganda; Tanzania	1969	Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the Republic of Kenya	0
7	Associated States	1969	Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community (Yaoundé II)	1
8	Israel	1970	Agreement with Israel negotiated under article XXVIII paragraph 4 of the GATT	0
9	Malta	1970	Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Malta	0
10	Spain	1970	Agreement between the European Economic Community and Spain	0
11	Turkey	1970	ECC–Turkey association	1
12	Cyprus	1972	Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and the Republic of Cyprus	0
13	Egypt	1972	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Arab Republic of Egypt	0

Table A1: (Continued)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Partner country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>PTA type</i>
14	Iceland	1972	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland	0
15	Lebanon	1972	Agreement between the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Lebanese Republic	0
16	Portugal	1972	Agreements between the European Communities and the Republic of Portugal – Information furnished by the parties to the agreements	0
17	Portugal	1972	Agreements between the European Communities and the Republic of Portugal	0
18	Sweden	1972	Agreements between the European Communities and Sweden	0
19	Switzerland	1972	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation	0
20	Austria	1972	Agreements between the European Communities and Austria	0
21	Finland	1973	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Finland	0
22	Norway	1973	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway	0
23	Israel	1975	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel	0
24	ACP States	1975	ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé	1
25	Algeria	1976	Agreement between the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria	0
26	Morocco	1976	Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and Morocco	1
27	Tunisia	1976	Agreement between the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Republic of Tunisia	NA
28	Egypt	1977	Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Arab Republic of Egypt	0
29	Jordan	1977	Interim Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	0
30	Lebanon	1977	Interim Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Lebanese Republic	0
31	Syria	1977	Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Syrian Arab Republic	0
32	ACP States	1979	Second ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 31 October 1979	1
33	Yugoslavia	1980	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the field of transport	0
34	ACP States	1984	Third ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 8 December 1984	1
35	China	1985	Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China	0

Table A1: (Continued)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Partner country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>PTA type</i>
36	Andorra	1989	Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Economic Community and the Principality of Andorra	0
37	ACP States	1989	Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989	1
38	Soviet Socialist Republics	1989	Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on trade and commercial and economic cooperation	NA
39	Czech Republic	1991	Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters between the European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, of the other part	0
40	Faroe Islands	1991	Agreement between the European Economic Community of the one part and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands of the other part	0
41	Hungary	1991	Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other part	1
42	Poland	1991	Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part	1
43	San Marino	1991	Agreement on Cooperation and Customs Union between the European Economic Community and the Republic of San Marino	1
44	Bulgaria	1993	Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part	1
45	Estonia	1993	Agreement on Free Trade and Trade-Related Matters between the European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part	0
46	Romania	1993	Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part	1
47	Slovakia	1993	Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Slovak Republic, of the other part	1
48	Slovenia	1993	Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Slovenia	0
49	Latvia	1994	Agreement on Free Trade and Trade-Related Matters between the European Community, the European Atomic Energy and the European Coal and Steel Community and the Republic of Latvia	0

Table A1: (Continued)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Partner country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>PTA type</i>
50	Lithuania	1994	Agreement on Free Trade and Trade-Related Matters between the European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania, of the other part	0
51	Russia	1994	Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part	1
52	Ukraine	1994	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part	1
53	Moldova	1994	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Moldova	1
54	Estonia	1995	Europe Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Estonia	1
55	Israel	1995	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States and the State of Israel	1
56	Latvia	1995	Europe Agreement establishing the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Latvia	1
57	Lithuania	1995	Europe Agreement establishing the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Lithuania	1
58	Tunisia	1995	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Tunisia	1
59	Turkey	1995	EC Turkey implementation of the final phase of the customs union	0
60	Belarus	1995	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Belarus	1
61	Kazakhstan	1995	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Kazakhstan	1
62	Kyrgyzstan	1995	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Kyrgyz Republic	1
63	Faroe Islands	1996	Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part	0
64	Morocco	1996	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part	1
65	Slovenia	1996	Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, acting within the framework of the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the other part	1

Table A1: (Continued)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Partner country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>PTA type</i>
66	Armenia	1996	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Armenia	1
67	Georgia	1996	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and Georgia	1
68	Uzbekistan	1996	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Uzbekistan	1
69	Jordan	1997	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part	1
70	Palestinian Authority	1997	Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaz, of the other part	1
71	South Africa	1999	Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States and the Republic of South Africa	0
72	Switzerland	1999	Bilateral Agreements I	1
73	Azerbaijan	1999	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Azerbaijan	1
74	ACP States	2000	Partnership Agreement between African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and its Member States (Cotonou Agreement)	1
75	Mexico	2000	Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States and the United Mexican States	1
76	Croatia	2001	Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Croatia	1
77	Egypt	2001	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States and the Arab Republic of Egypt	1
78	Macedonia	2001	Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1
79	Algeria	2002	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria	1
80	Chile	2002	Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States and the Republic of Chile	1

Table A1: (Continued)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Partner country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>PTA type</i>
81	Lebanon	2002	Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States and the Republic of Lebanon	1
82	Tajikistan	2004	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the other part	1
83	Albania	2006	Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Albania	1
84	Montenegro	2007	Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Montenegro	1
85	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2008	Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
86	CARIFORUM	2008	Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States and the European Community and its Member States	0
87	Cote d'Ivoire	2008	Stepping Stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Cote d'Ivoire and the European Community and its Member States	0
88	Serbia	2008	Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Community and their Member States and the Republic of Serbia	1
89	ESA States	2009	Interim Agreement establishing a framework for an economic partnership agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, on the other part	NA
90	Papua New Guinea; Fiji	2009	Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Pacific States	0
91	Korea	2010	Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part	0
92	Central America	2012	Agreement establishing an association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America, on the other	1
93	Peru; Colombia; Ecuador	2012	Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part	0
94	Philippines	2012	Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its member states, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part	1
95	Georgia	2014	Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part	1

Table A1: (Continued)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Partner country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>PTA type</i>
96	Moldova	2014	Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part	1
97	Ukraine	2014	Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part	1
98	ECOWAS; UEMOA; West African States	2014	Economic Partnership Agreement between the West African States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the European Union and its Member States	0
99	Kosovo	2015	Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part	1
100	Kazakhstan	2015	Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Kazakhstan	1
101	Canada	2016	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union	0
102	EAC	2016	Economic Partnership Agreement between the East African Community Partner States and the European Union	0
103	SADC	2016	Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part	0
104	Ghana	2016	Stepping Stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part	0
105	Armenia	2017	Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part	1
106	Japan	2018	Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an economic partnership	0
107	Singapore	2018	Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore	0
108	Vietnam	2019	Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam	0
109	United Kingdom	2020	Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part	1

Abbreviations: NA, not applicable; PTA, preferential trade agreement.

Source: MITA dataset, available at <https://zenodo.org/record/7837954>.

Table A2: Migration Control Variables in PTAs.

Variable	Operationalization
conobj	Definition: Explicitly stated objective of the agreement mentioning migration control, either in the preamble or in the introductory articles of the main text/protocols/declarations outlining the agreement's objectives. Literal question: Does the agreement mention the objective of migration control?
conchp	Definition: Control provisions have their own dedicated part in an agreement (such as chapter or protocol). Annexes devoted to control provisions are not coded as dedicated part of an agreement. Literal question: Does the agreement contain a dedicated chapter on migration control?
condia	Definition: Commitment to a dialogue between the parties on the matter of migration control. Often mentioned under cooperation in the social field. Literal question: Does the agreement include a commitment on a dialogue on migration control?
conrea	Definition: Commitment on the readmission of the own nationals. Literal question: Does the agreement include a commitment to readmit nationals?
conrtn	Definition: Commitment on the resettlement and reintegration of returnees and refugees. This involves support of citizens that have returned and is therefore applies to measures after readmission. Literal question: Does the agreement include a commitment to support the reintegration/hosting of (returned) migrants and refugees?
conirr	Definition: Commitment on preventing irregular migration and smuggling. In the official terminology, mostly called 'illegal migration'. Literal question: Does the agreement include a commitment to prevent irregular migration?
conreg	Definition: Regulatory cooperation is any commitment regarding the cooperation of state authorities such as the exchange of information/statistics and transparency between state authorities or institutional cooperation such as contact points or comprehensive consultation commitments. Regulatory cooperation must be on the issue of migration control. Literal question: Does the agreement include a commitment on regulatory cooperation on migration control?
condev	Definition: Explicit link between development and migration control. This typically involves a commitment to address the root causes of migration and foster development with the intention to reduce migration pressure. Literal question: Does the agreement draw a link between migration control and the development of sending countries?
concom	Definition: Compliance commitment to a bilateral or plurilateral agreement that seeks to control migration (e.g., readmission agreements). Literal question: Does the agreement require compliance with an international agreement regulating migration control?
condsm	Definition: Dispute settlement mechanism that applies to provisions on migration control. Literal question: Does the agreement contain a dispute settlement mechanism for migration control provisions?

Abbreviation: PTAs, preferential trade agreements.

Source: MITA Codebook, available at <https://zenodo.org/record/7837954>.

Table A3: Agreement Type Coding.

Type of agreement	Type code
Accession partnership	1
Stabilization and association partnership	
European Economic Area	
Association agreements	
Partnership and cooperation agreement	
Cooperation Convention	0
Customs union	
Economic partnership agreement and free trade agreement, respectively	
Cooperation agreement	

Table A4: Bivariate Regression Analysis.

	Trade dependence (log2)	Asylum applications (log2)	Route	PTA type	ENP country	Candidate country	Neighbour region	After 1999
(Intercept)	0.312 (0.257)	1.569 (0.920)	0.453*** (0.106)	0.032*** (0.026)	0.450*** (0.109)	0.692 (0.160)	0.412** (0.117)	0.379*** (0.101)
Coefficient	1.327 (0.265)	1.026 (0.073)	3.259*** (1.510)	69.324*** (60.692)	2.685* (1.156)	0.645 (0.282)	2.245* (0.896)	3.396*** (1.409)
N	73	55	109	106	109	109	109	109
R ²	0.042	0.011	0.064	0.467	0.050	0.010	0.039	0.084
RMSE	0.49	0.48	0.47	0.36	0.47	0.48	0.47	0.46

Note: Dependent variable: PTA contains at least one migration control provision. Method: Probit regression with penalized maximum likelihood estimators. All coefficients are exponentiated. Abbreviations: ENP, European Neighbourhood Policy; PTA, preferential trade agreement; RMSE, root mean square error.

* $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5: Multivariate Regression Models.

	(1)	(2)
(Intercept)	0.072 ⁺ (0.102)	0.012*** (0.015)
Trade dependence (log2)	1.476 (0.456)	1.338 (0.340)
Asylum applications (log2)	0.927 (0.091)	
PTA type	10.936* (11.260)	59.542*** (54.723)
ENP country	4.774 ⁺ (4.676)	
Candidate country	1.922 (2.931)	
After 1999	1.555 (1.258)	3.815 ⁺ (2.871)
Route		0.991 (0.745)
<i>N</i>	44	69
<i>R</i> ²	0.478	0.625
RMSE	0.32	0.31

Note: Dependent variable: PTA contains at least one migration control provision. Method: Probit regression with penalized maximum likelihood estimators. All coefficients are exponentiated. Abbreviations: ENP, European Neighbourhood Policy; PTA, preferential trade agreement; RMSE, root mean square error.

⁺*p* < 0.1. **p* < 0.05. ***p* < 0.01. ****p* < 0.001.

Figure A1: Correlation Heatmap for Migration Control Variables in Preferential Trade Agreements. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]




Figure A2: Correlation Heatmap for Independent Variables. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.13853)]



Figure A3: Histogram for Trade Dependence and Asylum Applications Variable. [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions)]

