

Chapter 12

The Radical Right in Power

A Comparative Analysis of Their Migration Policy Influence

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In December 2017 a new Austrian government, a coalition between the centre-right ÖVP and the radical right FPÖ, was sworn in. The electoral campaigns of both parties focused on the issue of immigration and on appearing tough in this realm. However, one of the first policy choices of the new government was to increase the immigration quota and to allow for the facilitated recruitment of workers from non-European countries by expanding the list of professions with labour shortages.¹ In other words, while the radical right cabinet has positioned itself as strongly anti-immigration, it has instead enacted a liberalization of immigration soon after taking office. This puzzle serves as an illustrative starting point for this chapter, which conducts a fine-grained analysis of the influence of radical right populist parties (RRPP) on migration policy when they gain government office. Do governments with the support of the radical right enact more migration policy changes? Do migration policies become more restrictive when the radical right takes government power?

Not just in Austria, but in most West European countries more broadly radical right populist parties have established themselves as a permanent feature of national party systems. In several countries they have joined coalition governments or provided support to minority governments (De Lange, 2012). The unifying feature of these parties is their opposition to immigration and multi-cultural societies (Mudde, 2013). However, despite the electoral mobilization of anti-immigration sentiments, European countries have overall become more open to immigration and expanded immigrant rights over the last three decades (De Haas et al., 2018; Helbling and Kalkum, 2017). Previous research provides mixed evidence for the policy influence of the radical right on migration policies and suggests that their influence is limited even when holding government office (Mudde, 2013; Muis and Immerzeel,

2017, 918). Scholars raise doubts on whether RRPPs are the cause behind restrictive reforms of migration policy. Money (1999), for instance, argues that governments before the emergence of RRPPs' influence have already enacted immigration restrictions, while others suggest that the preferences of mainstream-right parties, not the radical right, drive immigration restrictions (Akkerman, 2012; Duncan, 2010). The evidence is therefore inconclusive on whether and how RRPPs are able to use their policy-shaping capacity to further their migration policy agenda when they enter government coalitions.

This chapter analyses the migration policy output of RRPP-supported governments in Western Europe and tests the effect of the radical right on the quantity and quality of migration policy output. In so doing, I provide two main contributions to the literature. The first contribution is theoretical. I discuss how the policy attributes of admission, integration and control policies provide opportunities to and constraints on the radical right to shape government policies. The second contribution is empirical. I use a new large-*N* dataset of migration policies by governments across eighteen countries between 1990 and 2014. This chapter builds upon my previous analysis on the policy success of RRPP and expands it in scope and depth to assess the effect of government participation in more details (cf. Lutz, 2019).

THE RADICAL RIGHT AS POLICY-MAKER

Radical right populist parties are anti-immigration parties. Nativism is their definitional trait and their preference for more restrictive migration policies is their most salient issue preference (Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2008). The central role that immigration plays in the policy agenda of RRPPs makes migration policy an important area to assess the performance of these parties as governors and policy-makers.

The influence of a party can be defined as a change in government policy that would not have occurred without the party's existence (see also Carvalho, 2013; Williams, 2006). In this contribution, I define the influence of RRPPs on migration policy as their capacity to enact policy restrictions (change-enabling) as well as their capacity to prevent policy liberalization (change-constraining) when compared to the migration policies of the counterfactual situation without RRPPs in government. This pathway of influence has been discussed as the direct policy influence of parties in contrast to the more indirect influence on government policies by exerting pressure on governments as an opposition party (Schain, 2006). The radical right has continuously expanded its policy-shaping capacity by entering governments as a junior partner or by providing support to minority governments in Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Italy (De Lange, 2012;

Mudde, 2013). This chapter analyses the direct policy influence of RRPP as part of government coalitions while accounting for the pathway of an indirect influence.

Despite a burgeoning literature on the political consequences of the electoral success of RRPP, evidence on their policy influence after gaining government office is limited and inconclusive. Minkenberg (2001, 16) concludes that for the first radical right government participation in Austria in the year 2000 the centre-right coalition partner adopted a more restrictive stance on immigration when entering the coalition. In a similar vein, Zaslove (2004) concludes that in Austria and Italy, governing RRPP have been instrumental in passing more restrictive immigration policies. In studying the policy influence of the Lega Nord in Italy, Carvalho (2016) also finds a moderate influence on government policies. Others, however, find no evidence for a direct influence of RRPP on migration policies. Manatschal (2012) studies sub-national integration policies in Switzerland and finds no policy effect of the government participation of the Swiss People's Party, branded as the most successful RRPP in Western Europe. Reaching a similar conclusion, Zincone (2006) argues that the immigration policy of Italy is characterized by a remarkable continuity despite the participating role of the radical right in the government. For the Austrian case, Duncan (2010) concludes that restrictive reforms on immigration and integration during the time of radical right government participation do not deviate substantially from those of comparable cabinets. By comparing twenty-seven cabinets from nine European countries between 1996 and 2010, Akkerman (2012) shows that when the radical right gains governing power migration policies are restrictive but not more restrictive than those of mainstream-right cabinets. In a comparative analysis of RRPP influence in France, Italy and the UK, Carvalho (2013, 193) concludes that government participation is only weakly correlated with their policy influence. Overall, the review of previous evidence suggests that the radical right has limited influence on migration policies also when joining a government coalition (Mudde, 2013; Muis and Immerzeel, 2017).

Previous studies on the influence of RRPP on migration policies rely almost exclusively on qualitative case studies with a focus on specific parties. These studies provide detailed insights into particular RRPPs in different country-specific contexts. However, they often draw conflicting conclusions for the same empirical cases (Carvalho, 2016, 665). Furthermore, case studies grapple with assessing the counter-factual outcome: are the observed (restrictive) policies the result of the radical right or would they have also occurred in the absence of a RRPP as coalition partner? Scholars studying party competition stress that a move towards more restrictive positions on immigration is attractive for mainstream-right parties independent of whether they face electoral competition from the radical right (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and

da Fonseca, 2011). Restrictive migration policy changes may hence originate from the ideology or electoral strategy of mainstream-right parties instead of radical right pressure (e.g. Duncan, 2010; Money, 1999). As a result, it remains largely an open question whether RRPPs exert a significant influence on migration policies when winning government office.

THE SELECTIVE CO-OPTATION OF THE RADICAL RIGHT

When RRPPs have gained a government office and therefore the capacity to shape policy, they have done so as junior partners of mainstream-right parties.² The resulting policy choices are therefore necessarily the result of a bargaining interaction between the mainstream-right and the radical right. Only when the mainstream-right party co-opts the more restrictive position of the radical right party we can expect a policy effect. Shifting their policy positions is electorally risky for parties. Such changes may alienate party voters, create internal divisions and undermine credibility in the public's perception. While policy inertia is generally the default option for parties, entering a coalition with the radical right provides mainstream-right parties the opportunity to gain a government office. Mainstream right parties co-opt the radical right most likely in those policy fields where ideological shifts are less costly and governing constraints lower. Following Akkerman (2015), I argue that this co-optation is likely to be selective in the case of a multi-dimensional policy such as immigration. I expect the decision of mainstream parties to co-opt or to oppose RRPPs to depend on the constraints and opportunities defined by the policy attributes of different sub-fields.

Although most scholars acknowledge the multidimensionality of migration policy, much of the relevant empirical research often does not explicitly take it into account. Based on an extensive literature on migration policy, I identify three sub-fields that differ in their policy attributes and in how conducive they are to influence from the radical right. Numerous scholars draw a main conceptual distinction between migration regulations and migration controls (Bjerre et al., 2015; De Haas et al., 2015; Helbling and Kalkum, 2017). Regulatory policies can be further differentiated into the admission and integration of immigrants. RRPP position themselves as consistently anti-immigration with a preference for more restrictive policies on admission, integration and control (Zaslove, 2004). While the radical right exerts pressure for restrictive policies across all sub-fields, the actual policy choices of governments are likely to depend on contextual characteristics of these policies. Ample evidence has shown that these three sub-fields follow different empirical patterns (De Haas et al., 2018; Helbling and Kalkoum, 2017) and distinct

political logics (Duncan and van Hecke, 2008; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money 1999). Many previous studies have treated migration policy as uniform, thereby not taking into account the variation of policy influence across different sub-fields. In the following, I discuss structural and ideological policy attributes that determine the opportunities and constraints of co-opting the radical right in admission, integration and control policies.

Admission policies contain all regulations about the entry and stay of immigrants. Although it is considered to be the sovereign right of nation states to decide whom to admit, states are severely limited in their policy choices due to structural constraints. Economic globalization and political internationalization have created latent pressures for liberalization and powerful constraints to restrictive admission policies (Hollifield, 2004). The structural dependency that compels a country to be open to immigration may motivate a government to shun restrictive reforms, since all governments are motivated to preserve the prosperity and competitiveness of the national economy. Over the last decades, the expansion of rights-based politics helped to expand immigrant rights across borders and create legal obligations that have reduced the space for discretionary admission policies (Joppke, 1998). Hence, global markets and individual rights severely limit the leeway of governing parties in admission policies. On the level of political ideology, admission policy is often described as a cross-cutting issue (e.g. Odmalm, 2011). Mainstream right parties are divided between cultural conservatism and economic liberalism. Mainstream left parties are divided between the protection of domestic workers and the universal principles of justice and equality. These internal divisions constrain the ideological mobility of parties and make the use of policy shifts to gain advantages in electoral competition less likely (Davis, 2012). Consequently, mainstream right parties share a moderate position on immigration in order to balance different constituents and internal factions with competing preferences. Co-opting the radical right's stance in admission policy may result in high electoral costs by alienating party members and constituents, as well as deepening internal tensions (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008). Both structural and ideological constraints create significant costs for the co-optation of more restrictive admission policies by mainstream-right parties.

Integration policies define the rights and freedoms of immigrants that are already admitted to the country. Such policies, mostly comprise domestic issues where international interdependencies and obligations are less of a constraint (Fitzgerald et al., 2014, 408). These policies regulate the terms of immigrants' incorporation into the host society and tend to follow different national models shaped by distinct understandings of the national community (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans et al., 2012). Regarding political ideology, mainstream parties align along a socio-cultural divide with the left advocating

liberal policies and the right advocating restrictive policies (Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008; Money, 1999). Liberal integration policies represent the left's ideology of social equality and is electorally deployed as a strategy to gain the votes of immigrants and ethnic minorities (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Right-wing parties, on the other hand, tend to favour restrictive integration policies that represent their conservative values and national identity (Akkerman, 2012; Joppke, 2003). As a result, mainstream-right parties find themselves together with the radical right on the restrictive side of the integration policy continuum. Shifting to more restrictive policies on immigrant integration might therefore be an opportunity to find a common policy agenda with the radical right. Both structural and ideological factors provide substantive opportunities to mainstream-right parties for the co-optation of more restrictive integration policies.

Control policies focus on the implementation of immigration regulations by surveillance and law enforcement. Unlike regulations, they do not determine the formal openness of a country, but function as deterrence of unwanted migration, meaning despite and against the intentions of states (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001). These policies address migration as an issue of sovereign border control and public safety. Although the effectiveness of immigration controls is often questioned, states are eagerly motivated to demonstrate control over immigration to claim their sovereignty and appease public anxieties (e.g. Wright, 2014). Furthermore, the capacities of states to control migration have increased over time, particularly by international cooperation (Lahav, 2004; Schain, 2009). Therefore, the area of control policies faces only limited structural constraints to actual policy choices. Regarding political ideology, mainstream right parties tend to have a stronger preference for law-and-order than mainstream-left parties (Akkerman, 2012; Joppke, 2003; Wenzelburger, 2015). Mainstream right parties find themselves together with the radical right on the restrictive side of the control policy continuum. We may therefore assume that the ideological costs of co-optation are limited. These policy attributes make control policies a likely case for RRPP policy influence.

Migration policies on admission, integration and control provide distinct structural and ideological opportunities and constraints for the co-optation of more restrictive policies by mainstream right parties. Such a co-optation of the radical right is most likely in the area of integration and control policy. These sub-fields offer a considerable policy space and allow for the integration into the mainstream-right ideology. Co-optation is, however, less likely in admission policy that offers a more limited policy space and collides with the economic liberalism of mainstream-right parties.

Finally, policy influence can be disaggregated into change-enabling or change-constraining effects. The government power of RRPPs can both enable additional restrictive reforms and prevent liberal reforms. Endowed

with government power, RRPP have electoral incentives to demonstrate to their voters that they are capable of providing effective governance and are able to deliver promised policies, in particular when it comes to their core issue of immigration. The office success brings policy-making capacity providing RRPPs with additional leverage to pass their preferred restrictive reforms. As a result, I expect governments with RRPP support to enact more migration policy output and direct policy effects to be most likely change-enabling by prompting the government to pass additional restrictive reforms.

DATA AND METHOD

The direct influence of RRPP on migration policies is tested by a controlled comparison of cabinets with different ideologies. I use a large-*N* comparative design to analyse the migration policy output of governments across eighteen West European countries between 1990 and 2014. These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Radical right populism gained momentum in the 1990s and RRPP increasingly joined government coalitions in various European countries (De Lange, 2012). To ensure a sufficiently uniform context, the analysis is confined to Western Europe.

For both theoretical and methodological reasons, governments are the unit of analysis. Governmental terms are not only the main reference points for parties and voters, but also does the enactment of a policy agenda evolve over the whole office duration. The use of government units instead of the more common use of country-year observations allows for a more accurate attribution of policy outputs to the responsible government. Comparativists have demonstrated that using data based on government terms measures partisan influence most accurately (e.g. Schmitt, 2016). I define a cabinet as a government with the same party composition and the same head of government. A general election taking place, changes to the party composition of the government or a new person becoming the head of government refers to a new cabinet. The cabinet data is based on the Comparative Political Data Set by Armingeon et al. (2017a).³

As the dependent variable, I measure migration policy as the aggregated policy output that captures the directional change of whether policies became more liberal or more restrictive. I define migration policy outputs as all laws, regulations and policy measures enacted by national governments regarding the admission, integration and control of immigration. Following De Haas et al. (2015, 12), we can understand migration policy openness (restrictiveness) as the extent to which a policy measure expands (or limits)

the rights and freedoms of immigrants. This definition is applicable to all three sub-fields of migration policy. In admission policy, it refers to the rights of immigrants regarding their entry and stay. In integration policy, it refers to the post-immigration rights of immigrant residents between a restrictive-assimilationist model and a liberal-multicultural model (see Lutz, 2017). In control policy, restrictiveness refers to the toughness of law-and-order rules. The data on migration policy changes is extracted from the DEMIG Policy dataset (De Haas et al., 2015) that measures the relevant policy output and offers sufficiently large coverage across time and space. For the purpose of this analysis, I assign each reform to the responsible government.⁴ The aggregated policy output of a government is calculated as the number of liberalization minus the number of restrictions, with separate scores for each policy sub-field. To evaluate the different dimensions of policy influence, I use the numbers of liberalization and restrictions as separate variables as well as the sum of all policy changes enacted by a particular government.

The main explanatory variable is RRPP government participation. The classification of this party family follows the widely applied definition of Mudde (2007), which includes nativism as a core definitional element of their ideology. A government is coded as 'RRPP' if it hinges on the support of at least one radical right populist party, including both formal and informal coalitions. Based on these criteria, I classify eighteen cabinets across six West European countries as radical right.⁵ The contrasting categories of government ideology, 'left', 'centre' and 'right', are integrated into a variable consisting of four categories. Right-wing cabinets serve as a reference category. This assignment allows for the estimation of the difference in policy output between mainstream-right and radical right governments. To control for an indirect influence of RRPP as opposition parties on government policies, I include the cumulative vote share of parties belonging to the RRPP party family at the last national election.

Based on the migration policy literature, the analysis includes a series of control variables that are likely to condition the postulated relationship. First, advanced capitalist economies are structurally dependent on continuous immigration and therefore face domestic demands for foreign labour (Hollifield, 2004). The higher the domestic labour demand, the more liberal policy changes we may expect. I include several factors to measure the latent economic liberalization pressure that results from such labour demand.⁶ Trade openness serves as a proxy for economic globalization as a driver of structural labour needs due to economic integration. The unemployment rate that represents the business cycle accounts for the short-term labour demand. All controls are aggregated by government terms using the mean values across the years a government was in office.⁷

The second group of controls is related to the political and institutional context. Migration politics should be affected by the salience of the issue and the degree that public opinion is politically mobilized. I account for these dynamics by including the net migration rate and the RRPP vote share as determinants of immigration salience (Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2017). The larger the ideological gap to the preceding cabinet, the more we could expect policy changes. The ideological distance between the incoming and the outgoing cabinet is included into the models. Following the veto player approach of Tsebelis (2002), the likelihood of a policy change hinges on the number of actors whose consent is necessary to change the status quo. Migration scholars stress that institutional veto players can restrict the influence of majoritarian sentiments on policy-making (e.g. Breunig and Luedtke, 2008). The number of veto players therefore serves as another institutional control (Database of Political Institutions, Cruz et al., 2016). The direction of policy changes may depend on the absolute level of policy openness that I measure with the IMPIC database (Helbling et al., 2017). To include such a policy baseline allows for the consideration of potential ceiling and level effects.⁸ The use of governments as units of analysis requires adjustment for term duration measured by the number of days a government was in office. The more time a government spent in office, the more time it had to enact its legislative agenda. The compiled sample contains 134 governments clustered by eighteen countries. In admission and integration policy, there are more governments with a net liberalization than with a net restriction. In admission policy, seventy-five cabinets passed more liberalization whereas only nineteen cabinets passed more restrictions. For integration policy, this ratio is 66:27. Most cabinets, however, restricted control policies with a ration of seventeen cabinets with net liberalization to ninety-one cabinets with net restrictions. Hence, previous findings on policy trends are confirmed with admission and integration policies becoming more liberal and control policies becoming more restrictive over time. Finally, I use data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to measure parties policy positions on immigration, integration and control policies (Bakker et al., 2015).⁹ This analysis will allow for the evaluation of whether or not ideological differences are responsible for variations in policy influence or if contextual policy constraints prevent governing parties from implementing their preferred policies.

The large-*N* comparative sample allows me to assess the policy output of RRPP-supported governments in comparison with other governments. To model the migration policy output of governments, I estimate a series of panel regression models. Since the policy data contains variation across countries and time, I need to account for additional sources of heterogeneity. I do this by including country fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors. The fixed effects eliminate all time-invariant characteristics of countries such as

most political institutions and other country-specific idiosyncrasies. There is no need to account for serial correlation since the policy outputs of cabinets are not strongly correlated over time.

Results

In a first step, I present the descriptive analysis of the migration policy output of RRPP-supported governments. All directional policy changes by radical right cabinets are shown in Figure 12.1. Despite the preference of RRPPs for more restrictive policies, we find liberalization across all three sub-fields, most pronounced in admission and the least in control. There are only seven governments that enacted more admission restrictions than liberalization, whereas this number increases to nine for integration and ten for control. The informal government coalitions enact slightly more restrictive policy output than formal coalitions with the radical right. Despite their anti-immigration agenda, when RRPPs join government coalitions, a substantive amount of policy liberalization happens.

To estimate the policy influence of RRPPs in a controlled setting, I run a series of panel regression models that take into account the clustering across countries, the varying cabinet duration and potential confounders of the relationship between government composition and migration policy output. The direct policy influence of RRPPs is estimated as the difference between RRPP-supported cabinets and mainstream-right cabinets without RRPP-support. The results are shown separately for admission, integration and control (see table 12.1). Model (1) on admission policy detects a small positive effect of RRPPs in government on policy openness, but the effect is not significant. This finding confirms the expectation of limited policy effects in policies of immigrant admission. In model (2) on integration policy, the effect of RRPPs' government power is negative, of substantial size and statistically significant. An RRPP cabinet shifts policy output on average more than two reforms into a more restrictive direction in comparison to mainstream-right cabinets. This finding confirms that integration policy is more conducive for RRPP influence. Finally, the direct policy effect of control policies in model (3) is just above zero and not significant. Unlike my theoretical expectations, this model finds no evidence that control policies become more restrictive with RRPPs in power. The three models confirm that there are substantial variations of policy influence across these three areas of migration policy.

The control variables have little explanation power. In particular, there is no evidence for indirect policy effect of RRPPs by their mere electoral strength. Regarding the general role of government ideology, there is also variation across the three policy fields. In admission and integration policy, left-wing and centre cabinets tend to be more liberal than right-wing cabinets,




Figure 12.1. Pyramid plots of migration policy changes by radical right cabinets.

Table 12.1. Determinants of migration policy changes

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Change in policy openness</i>		
	<i>Admission</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Control</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Government ideology</i>			
RRPP cabinet	0.40 (1.18)	-2.19 (0.99)	0.18 (1.09)
Left cabinet	1.16 (0.95)	0.98 (0.79)	-0.23 (0.88)
Centre cabinet	1.54 (0.90)	0.25 (0.75)	0.80 (0.82)
<i>Controls</i>			
RRPP vote share	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Trade openness	0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
Net migration	-51.29 (75.99)	-6.15 (63.87)	-85.72 (69.15)
Unemployment	-0.29 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.05 (0.12)
Veto players	-0.01 (0.39)	-0.00 (0.33)	0.19 (0.35)
IMPIC score	5.84 (4.42)	1.27 (0.57)	-2.99 (3.01)
Cabinet duration	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Observations	134	134	134
Countries	18	18	18
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.279	0.336	0.255

Note: All models are fixed effects panel regressions with country-clustered standard errors. Those coefficients that are statistically significant on the 95 per cent level are bolded.

but do not make a statistically significant difference. In control policies, cabinets appear similarly restrictive independent of their political ideology. Partisan effects are hence overall limited as is the policy influence of RRPP, with the exception of integration policy.

Economic controls play a relevant role only in admission policy where trade openness and lower levels of unemployment are significant predictors of policy openness. This suggests that admission policy changes are primarily determined by structural economic needs and business cycles. Net migration has a consistent negative effect on policy openness but does not reach statistical significance. The political and institutional controls also do not exert a significant influence on policy outputs. The effect of the ideological distance on the previous cabinet runs in the expected direction; that is, a shift to the left

goes along with more liberal policy changes. A high number of veto players has a negative effect on openness in admission and integration but a positive one for controls. Policy changes are, furthermore, not dependent on the absolute level of policy restrictiveness measured by the IMPIC score. In the area of admission and integration a restrictive policy baseline is associated with more liberal reforms, whereas in the area of control a restrictive policy baseline is associated with even more restrictive reforms. Finally, the duration of a cabinet is a significant explanatory factor for the extent of liberalization in integration policy and the extent of restriction in control policies but is not significantly associated with admission policy changes.

In a next step, I analyse the influence of RRPPs on the quantity of policy output a government enacts. For that purpose, I compare the comparison of mainstream-right and radical right cabinets regarding their number of policy reforms. Governments with RRPP participation enact more policy changes across all three policy sub-fields. In substantive terms, the radical right cabinets enact on average approximately two more reforms in admission and integration and roughly one additional reform in control. Furthermore, the numbers vary across sub-fields with most reforms taking place on immigrant admission and the fewest in control policy.

Following this analysis of RRPP influence, I estimate a series of models using the numbers of reforms as the dependent variable. The higher salience of migration issues for RRPP should result in an overall higher number of policy outputs when they are governing. Figure 12.2 plots the estimates for radical right government participation. Across all three policy sub-fields, there are more policy reforms in RRPP-supported governments than in




Figure 12.2. RRPPs' influence on the numbers of reforms.

comparable mainstream right cabinets. The difference, however, is only substantial in admission and integration policy. In these policies the effects lie between one and two reforms but miss statistical significance. These results corroborate the finding of an overall limited policy influence. Despite the additional policy output when the radical right gains power, the difference to mainstream right cabinets is not significant.

To further assess whether the influence of RRPP on government policies is rather change-enabling or change-constraining, I run models separating liberalization and restrictions (see figure 12.3). The results suggest that in all three policy areas RRPPs mainly enable policy change. Compared with mainstream right cabinets, the enabling effect of RRPPs on additional restrictive reforms is larger than the constraining effect of fewer liberal reforms. Moreover, governments with RRPP support enact more restrictions but also more liberalization in the external policy dimension of admission and control. Only in integration policy are changes consistently moving in a restrictive direction. The restrictive effect on integration policy is almost exclusively the result of additional restrictions that were enacted and to a much smaller extent by fewer liberalization. These findings show that when RRPPs gain government office, their only significant influence on migration policies is the passage of more restrictive reforms in integration policy.

To assess the robustness of the results, I conduct cross-validation tests by excluding single countries and governments from the sample. The results suggest that the main effects do not depend on a few influential observations or the specific case selection. Despite the small number of eighteen governments with RRPP support, the pattern of policy influence is robust to classification or sampling choices. Separate estimations of policy effects for formal




Figure 12.3. Differentiated estimates of RRPPs' policy influence.

and informal coalitions with the radical right confirms the overall pattern of their influence. Their influence is stronger in the case of informal coalitions compared to formal coalitions both regarding the quantity and regarding the direction of policy output. While this suggests that providing support to mainstream-right governments is sufficient to exert policy influence, this conclusion is tentative due to the low number of six informal coalitions the estimates are based on. The cumulative results of resampling tests suggest that mainstream right parties do indeed selectively co-opt the radical right when they form a joint government coalition. Co-optation is found only for integration policy but not admission and control policies.

What drives the varying policy influence of RRPP government participation across the three sub-fields of migration policy? Which policy attributes are responsible for this variation? In the theoretical section, I discussed two potential drivers: varying ideological distance due to the different cleavage structure of the policy sub-fields and external constraints limiting the policy space of a government. Is the influence on integration policies the result of an ideological proximity between the radical right and the mainstream right in this policy area? I evaluate this with the policy positions of RRPP governments using data on the policy positions of the governing parties. Based on CHES data I compare expert evaluations of party positions on immigration, integration and control for six coalition governments between the radical right and the mainstream right.¹⁰ All parties within these cabinets have a pronounced preference for restrictive migration policies across all three policy sub-fields. The position of the RRPP is systematically more restrictive than the position of their mainstream right coalition partner. Regarding the ideological distance there is little variation across the three policy sub-fields. On the 10-point positional scale, the average difference between the radical right and the mainstream right is 2.2 in admission, 2.6 in integration and 2.0 in control. This pattern suggests that the ideological distance between the radical right and their mainstream right coalition partners is very similar across the three policy sub-fields with the lowest distance in their control policy preference and the largest distance in integration policy. This systematic pattern across all cabinets excludes ideological distance as a plausible driving factor behind the selective co-optation of RRPPs. In turn, it is the attributes of policies themselves that shape the policy influence of RRPPs with different sets of governing constraints as the most likely driver of selective co-optation.

CONCLUSION

Radical right populist parties have risen to power in a number of West European countries since the 1990s. Does this increasing popularity mean that

they can use their new role as governing parties to shape migration policies following their restrictive agenda? The previous evidence on this question remains inconclusive and tends to perceive RRPP policy success as limited. This contribution has analysed the direct policy influence of RRPPs by a controlled comparison of radical right with mainstream right governments. The results confirm that the influence of RRPPs on migration policies is limited. Only integration policies become more restrictive as the result of radical right government power, whereas no systematic effects are found for admission and control policies. As theorized, a restrictive turn is more likely in the field of immigrant integration than in admission where governments have limited leeway for discretionary policies. The absence of any effects on control policies runs, however, against the theoretical expectation. A plausible explanation for this finding is that the continuous trend of control policy restrictions and the virtual absence of control liberalization already represent a policy development that is preferred by the radical right. Therefore, when RRPP-supported cabinets enact control restrictions, their policies do not deviate from those of other governments as a result.

These findings suggest that the radical right uses its bargaining power inside a government coalition to shape the migration policy agenda of governments. Overall, governments with RRPP support enact a higher number of policy changes than comparable mainstream right governments. Their policy influence is therefore primarily due to the enacting of additional reforms in the preferred restrictive direction than via the veto power on policy liberalization. This interpretation is corroborated by the finding that the restrictive effect of RRPPs on integration policies is the result of a higher number of policy changes and restrictive reforms and not by their vetoing of liberal reforms. In contrast, the mere electoral success of RRPPs does not result in significant policy effects despite the electoral pressure on governing parties.

The finding that RRPPs use their government power to restrict the rights of already admitted immigrants corroborates the common expectations that RRPPs are a threat to minority rights in liberal democracies and the freedoms of those who are not considered part of the 'people' (e.g. Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). The governing power of RRPPs may be in part an explanation of the backlash against multiculturalism and the extension of immigrant rights in Western Europe. This main finding can be reconnected to the example I depicted in the introduction of the Austrian radical right cabinet appointed in 2017 that liberalized immigration soon after taking office. This paradox can now be resolved following the argument and evidence of this chapter. The results have shown that the liberalization of immigrant admission is a common phenomenon among governments supported by the radical right. Instead, these governments opt for restrictive reforms in the domestic

field of integration where governments are less constrained than in admission policy. The liberal reforms of the Austrian cabinet do indeed result from such constraints. The increase of the immigration quota was a requirement of EU law and the extension of the list of professions follows commitments of previous governments and the structural labour shortages of the country. At the same time, the government has taken a series of restrictive reforms in integration policy such as restricting social rights, restricting labour market access and banning headscarves in schools. This policy agenda of the ÖVP–FPÖ coalition government provides a more recent confirmation of my argument: When the radical right gains government power, the rights of immigrants are restricted but not immigration as such. The distinction between the external and internal dimension of migration policies demonstrates that the radical right is more likely to affect the rights of immigrants than the numbers of immigrants in a country.

NOTES

1. <https://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5351546/Regierung-erhoeht-Zuwanderquote>; https://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5354524/Mangelberufe_Kurzwirft-SPOe-Angstmache-vor (accessed 30 October 2018).

2. This only applies to Western Europe after the Second World War. An outlier is Switzerland, where the coalition government has included not only mainstream-right but also the Social Democratic Party.

3. When there is a reshuffle between elections without change in the head of government or the governing parties, no new government is counted. The cabinets of Switzerland, with its consociational government, are treated as an exception and four-year cabinets along electoral terms are coded despite the annual change in the head of government. The Swiss head of government does not have an equivalent power as in other European countries; rather it is a *primus inter pares* within the cabinet of seven members and it has no additional capacity to alter the migration policy agenda (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, 75–76). Short-term cabinets of less than three months are excluded from the analysis.

4. One-third of the reforms in the sample occur in a year in which at least two cabinets were in office. The assignment of reforms to cabinets is based on the final political decision, e.g. approval by the parliament. The assignment was successful in over 99 per cent of reforms; only in the case of sixteen reforms was a clear assignment not possible.

5. The following eighteen cabinets are included: Schüssel I, Schüssel II (all AT), Berlusconi I, Berlusconi II, Berlusconi III, Berlusconi IV (all IT), Balkenende I, Rutte I (all NL), Bondevik II, Solberg (all NO), Bundesrat 1999, Bundesrat 2003, Bundesrat 2007, Bundesrat 2011 (all CH), Rasmussen F I, Rasmussen F II, Rasmussen F III, Rasmussen L I (all DK). The selection of cabinets largely follows the selection of previous studies (Akkerman 2012; De Lange 2012). Switzerland is a special case

with its government due to the consociational style of governance and its attendant ‘magic formula’. All cabinets from 1999 onwards are coded RRPP-supported.

6. The data for trade openness, unemployment rate, GDP growth from the CPDS (Armingeon et al. 2017b), and net migration from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2018).

7. I base the calculation on ‘year of influence’. The year of investiture is counted as the first year of influence, and additional years are included if the cabinet was in office at least for six months of the respective year.

8. A validation analysis shows that the DEMIG Policy dataset and the IMPIC dataset are comparable in their policy measurements over time (Schmid and Helbling, 2016). The use of fixed effects implies that the policy-baseline refers to the development over time but not across countries.

9. The CHES measures immigration policy positions of parties ranging from 0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration to 10 = Fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration. Integration policy positions are measured on a scale from 0 = Strongly favours multiculturalism to 10 = Strongly favours assimilation. Control policy positions are measured by parties’ law and order preference ranging from 0 = strongly promotes civil liberties to 10 = strongly supports tough measures to fight crime.

10. Data for the following cabinets is available: Solberg I (NO), Rutte I (NL), Rasmussen F III (DK), Rasmussen L (DK), and Berlusconi IV (IT). I exclude the Swiss cabinets due to their distinct coalition-forming process in the country, which includes all major parties.

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