

9. Migration: Conflicts Between Foreign and Domestic Policy

Sandra Lavenex, Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, and Philipp Lutz

Over the past three decades, migration has evolved from being primarily a domestic policy issue to being a core area of international politics. Switzerland's foreign policy on migration has had to navigate in the cross-hairs of conflicting dynamics. A persistently high economic demand for international mobility exists in parallel with the humanitarian challenges caused by an increasing number of conflicts and the disintegration of economic and ecological livelihoods in various parts of the world. While these external factors call for increased international cooperation, we observe increasing domestic opposition to immigration and a reluctance to make concessions that would compromise national sovereignty. The result is an ambitious foreign policy on migration, but one that is shaped by conflicting economic, humanitarian, and security objectives and whose scope for action is increasingly restricted by domestic political debates and decisions.

As the host country of the most important international organisations responsible for migration policy and as an initiator of pioneering cooperation processes, Switzerland has played a central role in the establishment of global migration governance. However, this leading role has not always received domestic support, as the recent debates on the United Nations Global Compact for Migration have shown.

Switzerland's European policy is a second foreign policy area in which the issue of migration has top priority. As an associate member of the Schengen area and the Dublin Regulations, Switzerland is actively involved in shaping the EU's migration policy and benefits from common regulations on the external border and responsibility for asylum

applications. On the other hand, the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the EU/EFTA, which is a necessary condition for economic association with the European Single Market, has remained controversial in domestic politics. Migration also occupies an important place in Switzerland's bilateral foreign relations with third countries – and this to an increasing extent. This prioritisation is reflected in the Federal Council's periodically published dispatches on Switzerland's international cooperation. While the word migration (including uses as part of a compound word) was mentioned 120 times in the 2013–2016 Dispatch, it was mentioned 221 times in the 2017–2020 Dispatch (Federal Council 2012 and 2016).

This chapter¹ discusses the development of Switzerland's foreign policy on migration at the multilateral, European, and bilateral levels and relates this development to the country's most important domestic challenges since the 1990s. The final section provides a summary of the successes Switzerland has enjoyed, the challenges it has faced and is facing in this area, and ends with a discussion about the future of Swiss foreign policy on migration.

Switzerland as a promoter of multilateral migration governance

The development of modern Switzerland is strongly linked to international migration. After experiencing considerable waves of emigration throughout the 19th century, Switzerland, as an early industrialised country, became a net-positive-immigration country in 1891. With the exception of the inter-war period, Switzerland, with its small and open economy, has since recorded persistently high levels of international mobility, both immigration and emigration. Swiss society has therefore been significantly shaped by migration: one quarter of permanent residents do not have Swiss citizenship and around 40 percent have a migration background. Around 70 percent of the just over two million foreigners living in Switzerland come from EU/EFTA countries. The three most common reasons for immigration are gainful employment within the framework of the free movement of persons agreement, family reunification, and education and training. Admission on humanitarian grounds, on the other hand, accounts for only around five percent of immigration (SEM 2020a).

The strong influence of migration on domestic politics is reflected in Switzerland's pronounced commitment to promoting international migration governance. The most important international institutions in

the field of migration date from the inter-war and post-war periods and only deal with individual sub-areas of the migration issue. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) of the UN, founded in 1919, is concerned with the rights of migrant workers. However, its mandate is limited to persons who are already resident in the territory of a member state and does not extend to the migration process itself. A relatively well-developed international regime exists for refugees in the form of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However, the definition of 'refugees' contained in the convention, with its focus on individual victims of political persecution, no longer corresponds to the complexity of today's forms of forced migration, and guidelines for intergovernmental cooperation are lacking. The inability of the international community to react collaboratively during the recent refugee crises clearly illustrated just how problematic this lack of rules for cooperation is. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is a third body working in this field. It, too, has its roots in the 1950s. Without regulatory powers of its own and with a funding base that relies almost exclusively on project-specific contributions from member states, this organisation is also not equipped to assume a leading role in multilateral cooperation. This has not fundamentally changed despite the integration of the IOM into the United Nations in 2016.

Resistance to greater international cooperation became apparent early on. On the one hand, control over the entry and residence of foreigners is one of the core tenets of national sovereignty; on the other hand, the complexity of the human rights, economic, security, and development policy aspects of migration, as well as differences between the interests of developing and industrialised countries, make it difficult to define common goals. These contradictions were reflected in the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, adopted in 1990, which has not been ratified by Switzerland or any other industrialised nation. An exception to the general move away from multilateralism in migration issues since the 1980s can be seen in the insertion of very limited clauses to facilitate the cross-border provision of services within the framework of the International Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organisation, which was adopted in 1995. However, the fact that these clauses only apply to a very small group of mostly highly skilled workers limits the significance of this

agreement for wider migration policy. This illustrates the complexity of migration relations today.

Against this background, Swiss foreign policy on migration focuses on supporting intergovernmental dialogue. The 'Berne Initiative', launched in 2001, was an important pioneering step. Initiated by the then Federal Office for Refugees, it aimed to introduce a process of continued consultation between all states affected by migration – countries of origin, transit, and destination – with a view to developing efficient cooperation mechanisms on a non-binding basis. As a result of this effort, the International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM) was adopted, which includes a common basis for understanding as well as practices widely considered to be effective in dealing with migration. The text met with the approval of more than 120 states and was incorporated into the work of the Global Commission on International Migration. Convened by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan with the active support of Switzerland in 2003, this expert commission aimed to promote a common understanding of migration and of the resulting priorities for cooperation. The commission concluded its work in 2005 with a report noting that governments continued to prioritise state sovereignty.

Thus, subsequent activity in the field has continued to focus on promoting a broader consensus through international consultations. Switzerland has engaged in in-depth dialogues at the ministerial level on the relationship between migration and development – a topic for which previous consultations had indicated a comparatively greater convergence of interests. The first High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development took place in September 2006 and led to the establishment of a new platform: the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD). Switzerland has supported the Forum since its inception and actively participates in its discussions. As a member of the steering committee, Switzerland is also involved in setting the GFMD's agenda. The aim is to promote cooperation and the informal exchange of experiences between states and other actors (international organisations, civil society, etc.) in the areas of migration and development. The GFMD explicitly views itself as a process outside of the UN and seeks to avoid political association in order to promote pragmatic and practical exchange.

Refugee movements due to climate change and increasing numbers of natural disasters motivated Switzerland and Norway to launch the so-called Nansen Initiative in 2012. The aim of this initiative was to pro-

vide better protection to refugees who have had to leave their countries of origin due to environmental hazards. Led by the Bernese law professor Walter Kälin, the Nansen Initiative brought together innovative approaches and examples of good practice from affected states and formulated a comprehensive Protection Agenda on disaster preparedness, adaptation to climate change, and humanitarian aid. A total of 109 states adopted the legally non-binding Protection Agenda in Geneva in October 2015. The Platform on Disaster Displacement, which is also based in Geneva, was set up to implement the Agenda.

Switzerland's next step was to support a second UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2013, which resulted in the first joint declaration in the history of the UN on future priorities in this area. The declaration is not legally binding; its significance lies primarily in its symbolic focus on consensus. Meanwhile, a certain amount of momentum also came from another area: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Switzerland was a member of the working group that drafted the first version of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Migration was taken into account in the drafting of several SDGs, but especially in the chapter on reducing global inequalities within Goal 10.7: 'Facilitate orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.'

This groundwork was to prove useful when, in 2016, faced with the apparent collapse of the European asylum system and other refugee crises in South-East Asia and Central America, a summit of heads of state and government on the topic of refugees and migration was convened in New York for the first time in the history of the UN. At this UN summit, the international community set itself the goal of establishing two global compacts, on migration and forced displacement. The compact on refugees was able to build on existing conventions and institutions, in particular the Geneva Refugee Convention and the UNHCR, and was prepared and coordinated by the UNHCR. Like most states, Switzerland became party to the Global Compact on Refugees without major domestic controversy. In the Compact, states agreed to focus their development cooperation more strongly on the main refugee-receiving countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, to improve the coordination of various UN agencies dealing with refugee situations, and to develop initiatives that enable refugees to earn their own livelihoods more quickly.

The adoption of the migration compact proved more problematic. Its negotiation represents the culmination of Switzerland's multilateral engagement in migration issues. Together with the Mexican ambassador to the United Nations, the Swiss UN ambassador Jürg Lauber acted as 'co-facilitator', planning and coordinating the consultation and negotiation process that led to the adoption of the migration compact in December 2018. The strong support of the executive is evidenced in the Federal Council's 2017 report on developments in Swiss foreign policy on migration. According to this report, Switzerland was striving to achieve 'an ambitious, politically binding GCM [Global Compact for Migration] that sets out globally recognised principles, guidelines and targets for dealing with migratory movements on the basis of international obligations, follows a human rights approach, and helps to ensure that the potential of migration is more effectively exploited in the interests of all stakeholders' (Federal Council 2018, 2798). The agreement, which was negotiated over two years, sets out 23 goals that aim to do justice to the complexity of the challenge. It refers to the human rights of migrants both during the migration process and in host countries and calls upon states to facilitate legal immigration channels. However, it also calls for international cooperation against irregular migration and human trafficking, and addresses the relationship between development and migration. Although the migration Compact's final draft was adopted by consensus in the summer of 2018 by all negotiating delegations – except those of the USA and Hungary – the draft met with strong domestic political headwind in a number of countries. In Switzerland too, a deep gulf opened up between the country's foreign policy ambitions and its domestic scope for action. Conservative political parties and numerous members of the National Council refused to support the Compact. After a heated political debate, Switzerland's formal accession to the Global Compact for Migration was suspended until further notice, with the result that the Compact was finally adopted by 152 states – but not by one of its main sponsors – in December 2018.

Switzerland in European migration policy

Increased migration cooperation within Europe and the deepening of Switzerland's integration into the EU have significantly expanded the European dimension of Switzerland's foreign policy on migration. Two areas are particularly noteworthy in this regard: first, the opening of the Swiss labour market within the framework of the free movement of per-

sons in return for greater integration into the European Single Market; and second, Switzerland's interest in participating in European cooperation on migration control and asylum processes, particularly through the Schengen-Dublin regime.

Migration issues have played an important role in the process of Switzerland's European integration throughout. In the 1992 referendum on Switzerland's accession to the European Economic Area, the planned adoption of the free movement of persons was a central point of conflict in domestic politics and contributed to the failure of the proposal. Switzerland's strong interest in access to the Single Market, together with that market's principle of the four freedoms (goods, services, capital, and persons) then led to the gradual introduction of the free movement of persons within the framework of the Bilateral Agreements I of 1999. Political support for this was made possible by a broad domestic coalition that included trade unions and employers' associations, and by the inclusion of accompanying measures to protect the Swiss workforce from the risk of undercutting wages and working conditions.

This significant step in Switzerland's migration and European integration policy was primarily desired by the European Union and was a price that Switzerland was willing to pay for access to the Single Market. As a result, Switzerland largely lost the possibility of autonomous migration control for EU/EFTA citizens, and its migration policy has since been based on a dual admission model: the free movement of persons for EU/EFTA country nationals and a restrictive quota system for third-country nationals (Lavenex and Manatschal 2014).² Even though fears of a systematic decrease in wage standards and working conditions have not materialised (SECO 2019) and the need for foreign labour remains high – partly due to the ageing of the Swiss population – domestic political controversy over the free movement of persons has continued.

The dispute reached a tentative climax in 2014 with the narrow acceptance of the popular initiative 'Against Mass Immigration', which called for the reintroduction of immigration quotas and the prioritisation of Swiss nationals on the labour market. The constitutional obligation to implement the initiative stood in direct opposition to Switzerland's obligations imposed by the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons with the EU and created a dilemma for the Federal Council and Parliament. Since the EU was not prepared to negotiate restrictions on the free movement of persons, Switzerland was forced to choose between restrict-

ing immigration and maintaining the bilateral treaty package and thus its privileged access to the European Single Market. At the end of the three-year deadline for implementation of the initiative, the parliamentary majority ultimately gave greater weight to access to the European Single Market than to the people's desire for tighter migration control, with the result that Switzerland has retained the free movement of persons for the time being. Even though the popular initiative 'For Moderate Immigration' (Limitation Initiative) launched by the Swiss People's Party (SVP) to end the free movement of persons was rejected by a majority of the electorate in September 2020, the further development of Switzerland's access to the Single Market will likely continue to be marked by tensions over migration policy. For example, debates about the accompanying measures regarding the labour market massively complicated the negotiations on institutionalising bilateral relations through a 'framework agreement' (cf. Chapter 4). The free movement of persons thus remains a difficult domestic balancing act.

A second important area of Switzerland's European foreign policy on migration concerns cooperation in migration control. This cooperation was concretised in the Schengen Convention of 1990 and subsequent regulations, which, in addition to abolishing controls at the borders of the Schengen region, also include a common visa policy and cooperation on controls both at the EU's external borders and in the area of internal security. Politicians recognised the value of Schengen association early on (Wichmann 2009), but for a long time Switzerland was not prepared to give up its systematic border control. It thus took until 2004, when an association agreement was signed as part of the Bilateral Agreements II, for Switzerland to become a member of the Schengen area. Unlike most other bilateral agreements, this agreement also binds Switzerland to the further development of EU rules. In return, it opens up opportunities for Switzerland to participate directly in the EU Council of Ministers and its various bodies. Switzerland can thus be actively involved in the further development of the Schengen *acquis*. Switzerland is also an associate member of the European Border Management Agency FRONTEX and supports it both financially and by contributing experts and border guards.

By joining the Schengen area in 2004, Switzerland also became associated with the Dublin Regulation, which aims to coordinate national asylum systems within Europe. The Dublin Convention of 1990 (later integrated into EU legislation as a regulation) set out the responsibilities

for carrying out asylum procedures in the Schengen area for the first time. As a central principle, it determined that responsibility would in most cases fall to the member state whose territory an asylum seeker first enters. The fear of becoming a ‘reserve asylum country’, in which asylum seekers could file a second asylum application after being rejected in a European country, motivated Switzerland’s association efforts early on. The Dublin association agreement was finally signed in 2004, at the same time as Switzerland joined the Schengen area. Since then, the agreement has enabled Switzerland to return significantly more asylum seekers to other European states (especially Italy) than it accepts from other states (SEM 2020b). Switzerland’s advantageous geographical location makes it possible for it to transfer many asylum seekers to their European country of first entry.

Switzerland is also involved in the EU’s foreign policy on migration. It participates in dialogue formats with African states on strengthening migration management and on migration prevention, including the Rabat Process (2006) and the Khartoum Process (2014; Switzerland has been a full member since 2016). Likewise, Switzerland actively participates in the EU Emergency Trust Fund that aims to address the root causes of migration in Africa. In addition, since 2019, cohesion funds, with which Switzerland co-finances the EU’s cohesion policy, have been increasingly invested in migration-related projects in southern European countries. Over time, the common interests and institutional embedding have thus led Switzerland to participate more actively in European migration control policy.

Switzerland’s bilateral foreign policy on migration

The tensions between economic and demographic interests, humanitarian demands, and domestic political pressure are also reflected in Switzerland’s bilateral policies on migration – especially in the area of development cooperation.

These diverging priorities find their expression in the differing focal points of Swiss bilateral cooperation. In contrast to the post-war era of ‘guest workers’, when Switzerland concluded intergovernmental agreements on the regular immigration of foreign workers, labour migration is no longer a focus of bilateral cooperation today. Such cooperation takes place only in certain specific niches, such as stagiaire agreements, which allow young people to spend a period of time in Switzerland as interns,

and in free trade agreements. In these bilateral trade agreements, such as those concluded with China and Japan and, through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), also with other countries, countries grant each other mutual privileges on international mobility that in some cases go beyond the multilateral obligations foreseen by the GATS (see above). Overall, however, the focus here remains on a small number of highly qualified workers.

Instead, bilateral migration cooperation today focuses primarily on migration control and the return of migrants to their countries of origin. In international comparison, Switzerland plays a leading role in this area, for example through its Interdepartmental Structure for International Cooperation on Migration (ICM Structure), which takes into account the close interlinking of various policy fields in foreign policy on migration. Since 2017, the ICM Structure has been directed by the state secretariats in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM). Furthermore, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) of the FDFA and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) are represented in the ICM leadership at the directorate and state secretariat levels respectively.

Migration partnerships are a core instrument of bilateral foreign policy on migration. Since 2009, Switzerland has concluded six such partnerships: with countries in the Western Balkans in 2009 and 2010, Nigeria in 2011, Tunisia in 2012, and most recently with Sri Lanka in 2018. These partnerships aim at cooperation ‘through a comprehensive approach’, which includes the areas of refugee protection, migration and development, regular migration and return, and reintegration (FDFA 2019). A central concern since the beginning has been to facilitate the return of rejected asylum seekers and other migrants who do not have permission to remain in Switzerland (Medici et al. 2013, 11). The design of these partnerships is flexible and varies depending on the partner state. In 2017 and 2018, according to a report by the Federal Council, the focus of cooperation with the Western Balkan states was on improving their domestic migration and asylum management within these states; with Nigeria and Tunisia, it was on the readmission of nationals who did not have permission to remain in Switzerland; and with Tunisia in particular it was on agreements regarding Tunisian border controls and the prevention of onward migration toward Europe (Federal Council 2018 and 2019). Switzerland’s more recent migration partnership with Sri Lanka,

on the other hand, also focuses on economic migration from Sri Lanka to states in the Middle East (Federal Council 2019, 11). While migration partnerships are thus not solely oriented toward protecting Switzerland's interests, the focus on the return of migrants to their countries of origin and the prevention of irregular migration places the human rights of migrants and the economic and developmental opportunities provided by migration in the background. Support for border controls, for example, can be problematic from a human rights perspective if it leads to migrants no longer being able to leave a country, or being denied refugee protection (Medici et al. 2013, 32). Apart from migration partnerships Switzerland has concluded 55 readmission agreements which regulate the return of migrants staying irregularly in Switzerland (Federal Council 2019, 16). However, migrants' countries of origin have long recognised that the readmission of their own nationals is often contrary to their interests, despite their obligation to accept them, and they consequently use concessions in this area strategically – regardless of whether a migration partnership exists or not. In addition to migration partnerships and readmission agreements, Switzerland has concluded further migration cooperation agreements with five states (SEM 2017).³ The differing interests of destination countries such as Switzerland and migrants' countries of origin described above are often addressed in more informal settings such as in dialogues on migration. According to the SEM, dialogues of this kind are being conducted with around 30 states (SEM 2016). In recent years, the Federal Council's reports on foreign policy on migration have shown that the majority of the dialogues on migration focus on readmission and expulsion (Federal Council 2018 and 2019). Switzerland's adoption of a readmission agreement in 2018 that was originally concluded between the EU and Ethiopia also shows that its foreign policy on migration is closely related to that of the EU.

Finally, Switzerland's development policy also plays an important role in its foreign policy on migration, and vice versa. As early as the beginning of the 2000s, there were calls to link the granting of development cooperation funds to countries' willingness to readmit citizens. Over the years, concerns have diminished about such linkages, as well as about an increased emphasis on concessions granted in return for stronger commitments to migration control, to the fight against irregular migration, and to readmission. This is due to the assumption that development cooperation reduces migration either directly – for example, by

strengthening border police – or indirectly due to the role economic development plays in reducing migration pressure in migrants' countries of origin. Academic research, however, emphasises the complexity of the relationship between development and migration: economic development, it suggests, initially leads to an increase in emigration, as people are more likely to be able to afford it, and only leads to a decrease over the long term, once a relatively high level of development has been attained. Meanwhile, a number of factors besides economic development play an important role in individual migration decisions, including political instability, human rights violations, and conflicts. This all calls into question whether a development policy geared toward migration issues can actually contribute to a reduction in migration. The link between development and migration policy was nevertheless intensified in the wake of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016: the Dispatch on Switzerland's International Cooperation (IZA) 2017–2020 included a mandate to strategically link these policy areas (Federal Council 2016). At the same time, the post of Special Ambassador for Development, Forced Displacement, and Migration was created within the FDFA in 2017. In the International Cooperation Strategy for the years 2021–2024, migration is a major focus, one that shapes both the thematic and geographical orientation of Swiss development policy. Thematically, combating the causes of forced displacement and irregular migration is now one of the four central points of the strategy. Geographically, the link is evident in the countries prioritised (or not) for international cooperation – for example, in Switzerland's backing out of Latin America. The identification of the four priority regions – North Africa and the Middle East; Sub-Saharan Africa; Central, South, and Southeast Asia; and Eastern Europe – is to a large extent based on migration policy considerations. With the exceptions of Sri Lanka and Nigeria, all the countries with which Switzerland has concluded a migration partnership are also considered priority countries for international cooperation (SDC 2019).

The SEM, too, is active internationally, primarily promoting projects in countries of origin and host countries that are among the most frequent departure points for asylum seekers in Switzerland (e.g. Turkey and Jordan as host countries for Syrian refugees, Libya as a destination and transit country between various countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, and the Horn of Africa region as a host region for Eritrean refugees) (SEM 2020c).

Like migration partnerships, the linking of development and migration policy must be scrutinised to determine to what extent combating the causes of forced displacement and irregular migration is in tension with Switzerland's obligations with respect to human rights. Switzerland's migration policy dialogues with repressive political regimes show that migration control may divert the attention from combatting human rights violations and poverty. In the long term, this could prove detrimental both to the goal of international cooperation – namely, the reduction of poverty – and to Switzerland's own interests in the area of migration policy.

Track record, challenges, and outlook

In view of conflicting humanitarian, economic, development, and security interests, successes in foreign migration policy are difficult to measure and are rarely undisputed. An examination of Switzerland's engagement at different policy levels reveals interesting differences in priorities. For example, Switzerland's multilateral engagement is dominated by humanitarian concerns; in its European policy, economic priorities and an interest in cooperation at the external borders and in assigning responsibility for asylum seekers dominates; and in bilateral foreign relations, its focus is on the repatriation of migrants without residence status and on development policy measures to limit migration.

This difference in emphasis can be viewed as a kind of division of labour. However, it is not without internal contradictions, which can have a negative impact on the achievement of goals in individual policy areas. A striking example of this is the divergence between Switzerland's commitment to the United Nations' more humanitarian Migration Compact and its domestic policy debates, which are more closely aligned with the focus on security emphasised in its bilateral and European foreign policies on migration. Switzerland is internationally regarded as exemplary for its early move toward interdepartmental cooperation. However, in order to avoid such divergent processes as are evident in the case of the Migration Compact, stronger coordination between the levels of foreign policy on migration and, more generally, between foreign policy and domestic policy priorities seems indispensable. Without domestic backing, Switzerland's foreign policy commitments threaten to come to nothing. On the other hand, the cross-border nature of migration means that domestic policy objectives are doomed to failure without international cooperation.

As a first step toward such cross-level coordination, it would seem sensible to emphasise in domestic policy debates not only the demographic, economic, and cultural dimensions of migration but also the importance of human rights and international engagement. In an often-heated political environment, it does not hurt, either, to recall the historical context of global migration – including the fact that Swiss people also sought their fortunes overseas well into the 20th century. Even today, there is a broad and growing community of Swiss citizens living abroad. In Swiss foreign policy engagements, meanwhile, a human rights perspective often dominates, even though forced displacement and migration are directly related to violence, environmental degradation, and economic interdependence. This perspective is also dominant in the UN Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration. A comprehensive foreign policy approach could, however, also address the security-related, ecological, and economic dimensions of forced displacement and migration.

To conclude, it should be noted that the movement of people across borders takes place for a variety of reasons that can only be controlled politically to a limited extent, especially by a state acting alone. Switzerland's international engagement in this area thus points the way forward, but it should involve a comprehensive approach pursued at all levels of action, continuously influencing and influenced by domestic policy measures and discussions.

Notes on Chapter 9

- 1 Work on this paper has benefited from funding by the Swiss National Science Foundation's National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR), 'On the Move'.
- 2 The EU member states are also largely sovereign in their legal immigration policy toward third countries, as the EU does not have a common admission policy.
- 3 The five countries are Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia.

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